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Abstract: Does poverty or inequality explain the Maoist insurgency in Nepal? In 
contrast to previous studies we limit the analysis to the hill/mountain districts of 
Nepal as very few terai (plains) districts are classified as Maoist. And we conduct 
separate analyses for Maoist control and level of conflict. We find that income 
poverty and land-inequality are main determinants of Maoist influence, while the less 
visible income inequality is not so important. We also demonstrate that previous 
findings by Murshed and Gates (2005), where landlessness appears to be important, 
are due to two outliers that are the core Maoist districts. Without the outliers 
landlessness is negatively, and not positively, correlated with Maoist influence. 
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JEL-codes: D74, I32 
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1. Introduction 
On February 13, 1996 the Communist Party of Nepal-Maoist (CPNM) attacked a 
number of police stations in different districts of Nepal starting the so called People's 
war. The conflict escalated after November 23, 2001, when the Maoists for the first 
time attacked military posts. After ten years of war it appears that the Maoists realized 
that they will not win by military means, and in November 2005 they signed an 
agreement with the democratic parties, and a year later they signed a peace accord 
with the new democratic coalition government of the Seven Party Alliance (SPA). 
CPNM sees the insurgency as a struggle against feudalism and monarchy, and for 
political and economic change in Nepal. The insurgency can be interpreted as a 
violent element of a larger economic, social, and political transition, as discussed by 
Muni (2003), Thapa (2003), and Mishra (2007). A number of factors have contributed 
to the insurgency, including the historical legacy of the communist movement and 
previous popular uprisings, and economic inequality and poverty, as well as caste 
based and ethnic frictions. While scholars emphasize the complexity of the issue, 
political actors and commentators tend to focus on a single factor, whether it is 
ethnicity, poverty, or inequality. In this paper we acknowledge the complexity, but we 
will still make an attempt to single out the most important factors among those that 
may have contributed to the insurgency. We apply multivariate regression analysis. 
 The paper is not the first quantitative analysis of the determinants of the 
insurgency in Nepal, see also Murshed and Gates (2005), Do and Iyer (2007), 
Macours (2006), Nepal, Bohara and Gawanda (2007), and Tiwari (2007). But in 
contrast to the previous analyses we separate the level of Maoist control from the 
level of conflict1
                                                 
1 Tiwari (2007) also studies the level of insecurity as measured by UN-Nepal. These data are not 
publicly available. He also includes terai districts, and has a different set of explanatory variables. 
. As we discuss in Hatlebakk (2007) districts that the Maoists control 
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are not districts with a high level of conflict, as the Maoists tend to attack neighboring 
districts. There are also systematic differences in the independent variables between 
districts that the Maoists control, and districts they use as a fighting ground. 
Furthermore, previous studies have applied data from all districts of Nepal. This is 
problematic, as the Maoists have basically no control in the terai (plains) region of 
Nepal. By including a number of non-Maoist districts from a region where basically 
no district has been under Maoist control, one will get a biased representation of the 
determinants of Maoist control, as the terai region is in many ways different from the 
hills. We shall also see that the two core Maoist districts of Rolpa and Rukum are 
special cases that will change the sign of the landlessness parameter, which is the 
main focus of Murshed and Gates (2005). Section 2 presents the variables, including 
descriptive statistics, as well as the empirical methodology. Section 3 presents the 
findings, while section 4 concludes. 
 
2. Data and methodology 
As we argue in Hatlebakk (2007) there is no good continuous indicator of Maoist 
control. To make reliable comparisons between the indicators of Maoist control and 
the indicators of conflict level, we transform the continuous measures of conflict level 
into dichotomous variables by selecting a cutoff that gives approximately the same 
number of Maoist influenced districts. The numbers of people killed and displaced, 
divided by the district population, will be used as indicators of the level of conflict. 
We use a government classification, as well as the Maoists' announcement of a 
People's government as indicators of Maoist control. See Hatlebakk (2007) for more 
details on these indicators. 
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Table 1. Maoist-controlled districts according to different indicators 
People's government Government classification Displacement high Killings high 
Achham Achham  Achham 
 Arghakhanchi Arghakhanchi Arghakhanchi 
 Baglung   
  Baitadi  
Bajura  Bajura Bajura 
  Banke Banke 
 Bardiya* Bardiya* Bardiya* 
   Bhojpur 
  Dadheldhura Dadheldhura 
Dailekha Dailekha Dailekha Dailekha 
 Dang*  Dang* 
Dhading Dhading   
Dolakha Dolakha  Dolakha 
 Dolpa Dolpa Dolpa 
  Doti Doti 
Gorkha Gorkha Gorkha Gorkha 
Gulmi Gulmi   
  Humla Humla 
Jajarkot Jajarkot Jajarkot Jajarkot 
Jumla Jumla Jumla Jumla 
  Kailali*  
Kalikot Kalikot Kalikot Kalikot 
  Kapilbastu*  
 Kavrepalanchoc Kavrepalanchoc Kavrepalanchoc 
 Khotang   
 Lalitpur   
Lamjung Lamjung Lamjung Lamjung 
 Makwanpur   
  Mugu Mugu 
   Myagdi 
Nuwakot Nuwakot   
 Okhaldhunga Okhaldhunga Okhaldhunga 
Palpa    
  Panchtar  
Parbat Parbat   
 Pyuthan   
Ramechhap Ramechhap Ramechhap Ramechhap 
Rasuwa    
Rolpa Rolpa Rolpa Rolpa 
Rukum Rukum Rukum Rukum 
Salyan Salyan Salyan Salyan 
Shankuwasabha   Shankuwasabha 
Sindhuli Sindhuli Sindhuli Sindhuli 
Sindhupalchok Sindhupalchok  Sindhupalchok 
  Solukhumbu Solukhumbu 
 Surkhet Surkhet Surkhet 
Tanahu Tanahu   
  Taplejung Taplejung 
Tehratum  Tehratum  
 Udayapur   
*Terai districts 
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As we can see from Table 1 most Maoist districts are in the hills and mountains, only 
Bardiya and Dang are in (mid-western) terai. We may bias the findings by including 
terai in the analysis as the terai districts may be quite different from both the Maoist 
controlled districts, and the non-Maoist hill/mountain districts. By including terai 
districts we may thus not know whether the difference between Maoist and non-
Maoist districts is due to a difference between Maoist and non-Maoist hill/mountain 
districts, or whether it is due to a difference between hill/mountain and terai districts 
more in general2
                                                 
2 In particular there is no People's government in the terai. Including terai districts thus only increases 
the control group by districts that are very different from the Maoist controlled hill and mountain 
districts. That is, if we include the terai districts the findings would change in particular for the landless 
and mean income variables, which is explained by the higher mean incomes in the hills, and the larger 
proportion of landless people in the terai. 
. We thus only include hill/mountain districts in our analysis. As we 
find no systematic difference between hill and mountain districts we pool these in the 
analysis. As the dependent variables are dichotomous we estimate a probit model. 
 We apply data from the Nepal Living Standard Survey, NLSS (1996), which 
was collected in 1995/96 before the civil war started, to construct the independent 
variables. In principle we address the problem of reverse causality by measuring the 
independent variables prior to the conflict. However, this is not a perfect strategy as 
Maoist control during the conflict may reflect Maoist, or, more in general, communist 
influence prior to the conflict. Early communist influence may thus affect not only the 
level of Maoist control during the conflict, but also the explanatory variables, in 
particular the economic variables. We can thus not exclude the possibility of reverse 
causality, and the reported findings may be interpreted as correlations rather than 
causal effects. As the Maoists are not able to control urban areas, we only use the 
rural sample from NLSS. 
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 Indicators of poverty, inequality and level of income may explain the variation 
in Maoist control. We use expenditures, which were calculated by the Central Bureau 
of Statistics in collaboration with the World Bank and reported in NLSS (2005), as an 
indicator of household income. We use mean income for each district as the income 
indicator, the ratio of income at the 25 percentile to the 75 percentile as an indicator 
of inequality, and the headcount using the NLSS (2005) poverty classification, as the 
poverty indicator3
+−++= ∑∑ N/))yy((N/)y(F 0i2i10 βββ
. Since it is generally difficult to get a correct measure for income in 
poor countries, we also add land-value as an indicator, that is, we add the 25 
percentile to 75 percentile ratio for land-value as an additional inequality measure, 
and the share of landless people as a poverty indicator. In addition we add the share of 
different castes and ethnic groups and a dummy for the western part of the country as 
an indicator that may reflect the stronger communist legacy in this part of the country, 
as described by de Sales (2000). The probability of a district being Maoist dominated 
is Pr = P(F(X)), where the P-function is a Probit function, and the F-function is linear 
in the parameters and with a residual that is normal distributed, and where the vector 
X includes the explanatory variables discussed. If we suppress the caste and regional 
variables, the F-function can be written 
 
  
 N/Nz/zy/y 057525475253 βββ ++ , (1) 
 
where all variables are measured at the district level, N is the number of respondents, 
0N  is the number of landless households, 7525 z/z  is the 75 percentile divided by the 
25 percentile for land value, 7525 y/y  is the corresponding ratio for household 
                                                 
3 We use weighted estimates (except for the percentile command), where we take into account that 
weights vary between PSUs within districts.  
 6 
income, iy  is per capita income, and y  is the poverty line, which implies that the 
second term is the poverty head-count. Note that for the inequality measures a larger 
number implies less inequality. 
 Note that a proportional income growth will not change income inequality, but 
reduce income poverty, and increase average income. If the change in income leads to 
a change in wealth, then one may imagine that some households change the status 
from landless to land-holders. In that case 0N  may change, and also the inequality 
measure for land holdings. A non-proportional change in income may of course also 
change income inequality. As savings behavior may vary between districts, we note 
that the two inequality measures do not measure exactly the same, so we can use all 
indicators as explanatory variables. Table 2 gives the descriptive statistics for the 
explanatory variables for the Maoist and non-Maoist hill and mountain districts. 
 
Table 2. Descriptive statistics, hill and mountain districts 
 Poverty  
(%) 
Landless 
(%) 
Income 
(rs) 
25/75 
income ratio 
25/75 
land value ratio 
N 
Mao-gov 41 4 7200 0.53 0.21 29 
Not 40 4 7600 0.52 0.23 21 
Mao-self 45 5 7100 0.53 0.20 23 
Not 37 3 7600 0.52 0.23 27 
Killings 49 3 6600 0.53 0.23 28 
Low 32** 6** 8300** 0.52 0.20 22 
Displaced 48 3 6700 0.54 0.23 25 
Low 34* 5 8000 0.51 0.21 24 
** Significantly different from Maoist districts at the 95%-level 
* Significantly different from Maoist districts at the 90%-level 
 
As we can see the difference between Maoist influenced districts and non-Mao 
districts depend on the measure of Maoist influence. According to our a-priori 
preferred indicator, the government classification, there are only marginal, and non-
significant, differences between the two groups of districts. But there are significant 
differences between Maoist influenced and other districts, when classified according 
to number of people killed, and for the poverty head-count, also when classified 
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according to displacements. People in Maoist influenced districts are poor, but not 
landless. But note that these districts are not where the Maoists have their bases, but 
the neighboring districts, where they attack. If we look into the detailed data, then we 
find that for the very poor districts, with a head-count larger than 60%, only 7 out of 
14 districts are Maoist controlled, while 11 of the same 14 districts have had many 
people killed. The poor districts with many killings, but not defined as Maoist 
controlled, are Bajura, Doti, Humla, and Mugu. These are very remote districts 
located in the poor north-western corner of the country. We now go on to the 
multivariate analysis, to see whether our descriptive findings can be explained by 
other variables than poverty and landlessness. 
 
3. Multivariate findings 
Among the indicators discussed above, most previous studies have applied killings as 
the dependent variable, including the most influential paper by Murshed and Gates 
(2005). When it comes to the independent variables, previous authors have similar 
hypotheses to ours, but apply different indicators of poverty and inequality. We also 
believe that level of income, and wealth, as well as inequality, may explain the level 
of Maoist control, although not necessarily the level of conflict, which is the topic of 
the previous studies. We also make sure to apply a consistent set of explanatory 
variables, in the sense that all are based on data from NLSS. We do not use any other 
secondary data sources that might be of lower quality, and we do not use compiled 
indexes, such as the HDI, or the GINI, because we have problems interpreting the 
parameters for these indicators. 
 In our case all variables, and thus the parameters in (1), have immediate 
interpretations. A significantly positive parameter for 7525 y/y , for example, means 
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that if we compare two districts, one with a higher income at the 25 percentile as 
compared to the 75 percentile, then this district is more likely Maoist influenced. With 
a GINI-coefficient the change in the income-distribution can happen anywhere along 
the Lorenz curve, which to this author has a less intuitive interpretation. We report the 
multivariate findings for all four dependent variables in Table 3. 
 
Table 3. Probit estimates (weighted) for marginal change in the probability 
 maogov maoself killingshigh idphigh 
meanexp (1000) - 0.14 
 (0.09) 
  0.12 
 (0.09) 
  0.03 
 (0.09) 
  0.06 
 (0.10) 
inequal-inc 
(ratio) 
  0.77 
 (1.05) 
 0.55 
 (1.05) 
  0.20 
 (1.07) 
  1.78* 
 (1.01) 
poverty 
(%) 
- 0.94 
 (0.79) 
  2.19*** 
 (0.84) 
  0.18 
 (0.85) 
- 0.16 
 (0.85) 
inequal-val 
(ratio) 
- 1.37 
 (1.11) 
- 2.18* 
 (1.22) 
  0.74 
 (1.11) 
  1.22 
 (1.38) 
landless 
(%) 
- 0.01 
 (2.30) 
  4.02 
 (2.57) 
- 4.68* 
 (2.71) 
- 4.89** 
 (2.37) 
high-caste 
(%) 
- 0.91 
 (0.66) 
  0.01 
 (1.02) 
- 1.96** 
 (0.82) 
- 2.85*** 
 (1.06) 
newar 
(%) 
- 2.33* 
 (1.21) 
  1.07 
 (1.34) 
- 0.66 
 (1.15) 
- 3.34** 
 (1.55) 
tamang-gurung 
(%) 
  0.28 
 (0.81) 
  1.67 
 (1.08) 
- 1.64* 
 (0.93) 
- 2.27** 
 (1.02) 
magar 
(%) 
- 0.25 
 (0.81) 
  0.85 
 (1.03) 
- 1.40 
 (0.98) 
- 1.20 
 (1.11) 
rai-limbu 
(%) 
- 1.84** 
 (0.85) 
- 0.04 
 (1.09) 
- 2.43*** 
 (0.93) 
- 1.79* 
 (0.99) 
hill-dalit 
(%) 
- 0.53 
 (0.87) 
  0.38 
 (1.11) 
- 2.16** 
 (1.01) 
- 1.71 
 (1.26) 
west - 0.19 
 (0.26) 
  0.16 
 (0.27) 
  0.47* 
 (0.22) 
  0.64** 
 (0.18) 
Prob > chi2 0.0288 0.0219 0.0163 0.0380 
Pseudo R2 0.2785 0.3206 0.2821 0.3109 
N 50 50 50 49 
*** Significant at the 99%-level 
** Significant at the 95%-level 
* Significant at the 90%-level 
 
The five first independent variables are the economic variables discussed above, and 
included in equation (1). The next six variables are the ethnic-composition variables, 
with high-caste and hill-dalit having the obvious interpretations, and the remaining 
four having the names of major ethnic groups. The last variable is a regional dummy. 
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 We find that districts with more landless people are less likely to be conflict 
affected, as measured by killings and displacements. This is the opposite finding of 
Murshed and Gates (2005). The difference in findings is due to the two core Maoist 
districts of Rolpa and Rukum that are definitely outliers. If we replace our dummy for 
high levels of killings with the actual number of killings per population, and estimate 
a Poisson model as Murshed and Gates do, then we also get a positive sign for 
landlessness. But if we exclude Rolpa and Rukum, then the sign is negative, see Table 
4. Figure 1 illustrates why, Rolpa and Rukum are the two districts in the upper-right 
corner. Note that we do not have the same set of independent variables, but still we 
suspect that the results in Murshed and Gates (2005) are sensitive to these two 
outliers. 
 
0
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Figure 1. Rolpa and Rukum as special cases. 
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Table 4. Poisson estimates 
 killingspop, incl 
Rolpa/Rukum 
killingspop 
meanexp (1000) - 0.14 
 (0.12) 
  0.11 
 (0.08) 
inequal-inc 
(ratio) 
- 0.08 
 (1.53) 
  1.52 
 (1.38) 
poverty 
(%) 
- 0.79 
 (1.03) 
  1.42** 
 (0.71) 
inequal-val 
(ratio) 
  2.66** 
 (1.10) 
  0.09 
 (1.04) 
landless 
(%) 
  6.70** 
 (3.31) 
- 9.04*** 
 (2.88) 
high-caste 
(%) 
- 0.81 
 (0.65) 
- 1.18 
 (0.73) 
newar 
(%) 
- 2.33* 
 (1.23) 
- 1.82 
 (1.22) 
tamang-gurung 
(%) 
- 0.89 
 (0.59) 
- 1.57*** 
 (0.61) 
magar 
(%) 
- 0.68 
 (0.91) 
- 1.10 
 (0.70) 
rai-limbu 
(%) 
- 1.08* 
 (0.60) 
- 1.61** 
 (0.68) 
hill-dalit 
(%) 
- 1.83 
 (1.22) 
- 0.93 
 (1.14) 
west   0.60 
 (0.45) 
- 0.18 
 (0.37) 
constant - 5.75*** 
 (1.52) 
- 7.92*** 
 (1.06) 
Prob > chi2 0.0000 0.0000 
N 50 48 
*** Significant at the 99%-level 
** Significant at the 95%-level 
* Significant at the 90%-level 
 
We thus conclude that districts with more landless people are less likely to be conflict 
affected, as measured by the number killings, with the exception of Rolpa and 
Rukum. The finding is robust to the estimation method. The opposite finding, 
reported by Murshed and Gates, appears not to be robust. For the other indicators we 
find that landlessness cannot explain why districts are controlled by the Maoists as 
illustrated by the two first columns of Table 3. 
 Our second poverty measure, the head-count, is positively correlated with the 
probability of having a People's government, and is also positively correlated with the 
level of killings in the Poisson regression (without the outliers). So there is some 
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indication that poverty is an underlying factor that may explain the conflict in Nepal. 
The average income level, on the other hand, has no explanatory effect. 
 For land-inequality there is a negative sign for the People's government 
regression, meaning that as the lower income levels increase as compared to the 
higher levels, that is, inequality declines, then the probability of having a People's 
government declines. This finding is there also in the descriptive statistics, although 
not significant, the districts with a People's government have higher land-inequality. 
So, there is some support for the conclusion that land-inequality explains the support 
for the Maoist.  
 For income-inequality there is a significant effect for the displacement 
indicator, but with an opposite sign. There is less income-inequality in districts where 
displacement is high. Again there is some (insignificant) support for the same 
conclusion in the descriptive statistics. We have summarized the findings in Table 5. 
 
Table 5. Summary: Determinants of Maoist influence 
 Maoist control Conflict level 
Land-poverty  - 
Income-poverty +  
Land-inequality +  
Income inequality  - 
 
So we find that districts with a Maoist declared People's government have a higher 
poverty rate and more unequal land distribution than other districts. But there is no 
difference in land-poverty, as measured by landlessness, or income inequality. This is 
not surprising, land inequality is more visible than income inequality, while your own 
low income matters for recruitment into the Maoist party, and army. Landlessness, on 
the other hand, is low in all districts, and probably indicates that the household have 
other occupations than farming. This in turn may explain why landlessness is higher 
in districts with low conflict levels, that is, presumingly more urban districts. 
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 When it comes to the other control variables, we find that the east-west divide, 
which we hypothesized to be an indicator of the historical legacy of communism, 
explains differences in conflict level, but not Maoist control. We actually expect this 
to be a truly historical effect. The war started in the West because the far-left of the 
communist movement has been stronger there, and this is why killings and 
displacement are higher in the west. But later during the war, the Maoists have taken 
control in other parts of the country as well, which explains that we find no difference 
with respect to the two Maoist control variables. 
 The historical legacy has been explained by ethnicity, in particular the 
importance of the Magar community, see de Sales (2000). We have included the share 
of different ethnic groups at the district level using, again, NLSS data. The Magar 
population has no explanatory effect, but we find some other ethnic effects. Districts 
with a large Newar, or Rai-Limbu, population, like the Kathmandu valley, and the 
eastern hills, have a lower probability of being controlled by the Maoists. When it 
comes to the conflict level, we find that killings and displacements are higher in 
districts with a larger population of the control group, which is the group of 
households where ethnicity is not specified. These are in particular the districts 
Solukhumbu and Ramechap, which have relatively large Sherpa communities, and the 
districts Rukum, Salyan and Surkhet, which have relatively large non-Brahmin-
Chettri high caste communities (Sanyasi and Thakuri). 
 
4. Conclusions 
It is a problem when regression analyses are conducted without a proper 
understanding of the data at hand. Previous regression-based studies of the civil war 
in Nepal have focused on the conflict level, and have to various extent interpreted the 
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conflict level as an indicator of Maoist control. In Nepal this is not a proper 
interpretation, the Maoists attacked neighboring districts, while in their own areas the 
conflict level was not so high (except for the core areas). Furthermore, previous 
studies have included the terai districts in the analysis, which does not make sense. 
According to all available indicators, very few of the terai districts were influenced by 
the Maoists. Finally, as illustrated here, the two core Maoist districts are outliers. 
Excluding these two, the effect of landlessness goes from significantly positive, as 
reported by Murshed and Gates (2005), to significantly negative. So a proper analysis 
would either omit these two special cases, or would re-specify the dependent variable, 
as we do, and apply a dichotomous, rather than a continuous, indicator of a high 
number of killings. 
 When we implement these methodological changes, we find that districts with 
many landless households are less likely to be conflict affected. But the poverty-rate, 
on the other hand, is positively correlated with Maoist influence. In a sense we 
replicate the main finding in Murshed and Gates (2005), but we show that it is not 
landlessness that explains the Maoist influence, but income poverty. For inequality we 
have to separate the effect of land- and income-inequality. Land inequality appears to 
explain the support for the Maoists, while income-inequality is negatively correlated 
with displacements due to the conflict. These findings make sense. There are few 
landless households in the hills, so land distribution is more important than 
landlessness. And the distribution of income is less observable than the distribution of 
land, which may explain that this is not a determinant of Maoist control. Income 
poverty on the other hand is an absolute measure of well-being, and we shall expect 
that poor people are more easily recruited into Maoist organizations, including their 
army. 
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